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Disputes about the Legitimacy of the “New” Democratic Constitution 
in Postwar Japan 
                                               Toru Mori (Kyoto University) 
          
 I  The Never-ending Attack on “The Constitution of Japan”  
The Constitution of Japan, which is valid in Japan today, was promulgated in 1946 and 
replaced the Meiji Constitution. The former Constitution declared that the ruling power in 
Japan was inherently possessed by the Tenno (Emperor). The separation of powers and bill 
of rights were included in the Constitution, but the Diet (Japanese parliament) had only 
limited competence and in the end, the military forces gained despotic power by abusing 
the authority of the Tenno. 
 After Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, the Constitution was totally 
changed. The new Constitution declared the principles of popular sovereignty, the 
guarantee of fundamental human rights, and pacifism. The Tenno lost all political 
competence and the government system was totally democratized. Japanese courts gained 
the full competency of judicial review to nullify unconstitutional laws. This Constitution 
has never been amended until now. It is well established in Japanese society. 
 However, there are also some contradictory phenomena concerning the Japanese 
Constitution. The most famous case stemmed from Article 9 of the Constitution which 
declares that Japan shall renounce war as a means of settling international disputes and that 
in order to accomplish this aim, “war potential” will never be maintained. Japan has 
nevertheless had Self Defense Forces (SDF) since 1954. The SDF have grown to one of the 
biggest military forces in the world, but Article 9 remains unchanged. The SDF have been 
legitimized by the logic that Article 9 does not forbid the possession of forces for the 
purpose of self-defense.  
 Many politicians of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has 
been the primary ruling party, have demanded that Article 9 be amended to clearly 
recognize the legality of the SDF. However, their directive has not yet been realized. The 
responsible politicians in the government have not dared to make a proposal to amend the 
Constitution. Even today’s Cabinet, led by the very conservative Prime Minister Shinzo 
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Abe, has not done so. It wanted to enlarge the role of the SDF and has realized its goal not 
by amending the text but by changing the interpretation of the Article. Abe has recently 
made public his wish to add a new paragraph to Article 9 to guarantee the constitutionality 
of the SDF, but it is by no means certain if he will succeed. 
 To amend an Article in the Japanese Constitution, two-thirds of the members of 
each House of the Diet must concur with the proposal. The amendment is then submitted to 
the people and would be ratified if a majority of all votes affirm it (Art.96 (1)). The LDP 
has not tried to amend Article 9, perhaps because it is afraid to lose a national referendum. 
They know that Article 9 has been firmly established in the minds of the Japanese people. 
As a result, Japan simultaneously has Article 9, the pacifism clause, and the SDF, which 
were recently sent to Africa to conduct peacekeeping operations.  
 There is an even deeper contradiction concerning the Japanese Constitution. The 
LDP, which has been the ruling power for a long time under the Constitution of Japan, has 
not fully recognized the legitimacy of the Constitution itself. This party was founded in 
1955 and since then has persisted in its original mandate to enact a “self-made 
Constitution.” It aims in essence not to amend Articles in the Japanese Constitution, but to 
replace it totally. It even published a draft of the “New Constitution” in 2005.  
 The deep antagonism of Japanese conservatives toward the Japanese Constitution 
has its roots in the fact that it was enacted during the occupation by the Allied Powers (in 
fact by the USA alone) after the Second World War. It has been seen as an “enforced 
Constitution.” The three principles of the Constitution mentioned above have been also 
attacked as “enforced” principles, which originated in western countries and are not suited 
to Japan. The wish of the conservatives to replace the Constitution totally has no chance of 
being realized. Nevertheless, or just therefore, they adhere to the deficit of the legitimacy 
of the Constitution of Japan.    
 The title of this paper describes the Constitution of Japan as “new.” This 
Constitution is now 70 years old and has never been amended. It perhaps should be called 
an “old Constitution.” However, it is in some sense eternally “new.” It brought modern 
constitutional principles to Japan for the first time. This meant a revolutionary change to 
Japanese politics, but this change was led by the Allied Powers. There is a fundamental 
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contradiction inherent in the Constitution of Japan in that the Constitution which brought 
democracy to Japan was not born by the Japanese people. The conservatives do not 
recognize it as their own Constitution. It remains “new,” even though they have been 
required to act under the rules of the Constitution for such a long time.  
 
 II  The Birth of the August Revolution Theory 
Against this political background, most constitutional law scholars have defended the 
legitimacy of the Constitution of Japan. The most influential assertion for this purpose is 
the August Revolution theory first advocated by Toshiyoshi Miyazawa. Miyazawa was a 
University of Tokyo professor, one of the most important scholars of constitutional law at 
that time. 
 The Japanese government announced the draft of the new Constitution on March 6, 
1946. It was originally published as amendments to the Meiji Constitution, but the 
government planned to replace the former Constitution completely and also, in substance, 
it already contained the three basic principles of the Constitution of Japan. It surprised the 
people especially because it denied the sovereignty of the Tenno. It said that the Tenno 
shall be the symbol of Japan, and his position derived from the sovereign will of the people. 
Before the government announced its definitive plan to amend the Meiji Constitution, 
various political groups expressed their thoughts, but most proposals contained only more 
moderate changes. Many of them strengthened the power of the Diet while keeping the 
fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the Tenno.  
 Although the Japanese people sensed then that the Allied Powers had somehow 
acted behind the scenes to make the Constitution so radically democratic, the fact that they 
had in fact written the original draft and then “recommended” to the Japanese government 
to accept it was reported only after the end of the occupation.  
 Shortly after the announcement of the draft of the new Constitution, Miyazawa 
published an article in which he defended it with the idea of the August Revolution theory.1 
He stressed that the Constitution’s most important feature was the adoption of popular 
                                                     
1 Toshiyoshi Miyazawa, Hachigatu-kakumei to Kokuminn-shuken-shugi (August Revolution and 
the Principle of the Popular Sovereignty), Sekai-bunka, May 1946, at 64. See Shigenori Matsui, 
The Constitution of Japan 18-21(2011). 
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sovereignty, which meant the inevitable denial of the sovereignty of the Tenno. Under the 
Meiji Constitution, the power to rule Japan had come from the authority of the Tenno. 
According to the draft, it comes from the people. Even the position of the Tenno would be 
decided by the will of the people.  
 Miyazawa doubted if such a fundamental change of sovereign power could be 
realized by amending the Meiji Constitution. The power to amend the Constitution is itself 
authorized by the ultimate sovereign power. Therefore, he declared that changing the 
sovereign with an amendment clause was logically impossible. In Japan, the sovereignty of 
the Tenno could not be legally denied by using the amendment clause of the Meiji 
Constitution. Nevertheless, Miyazawa legitimized the government’s plan to enact the new 
Constitution as amendments to the Meiji Constitution. He found that in August 1945, at the 
time of the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, which had recommended that Japan 
surrender, the sovereignty of the Tenno had been already abandoned, because in the 
declaration the Allied Powers had demanded that the future Japanese government should 
be established “in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” 
Miyazawa interpreted this clause of the Potsdam Declaration as a request to adopt popular 
sovereignty. Japan had thus accepted a principle which was clearly contrary to the basic 
principle of the Meiji Constitution. This was a revolution in the legal sense.  
 Because popular sovereignty had already been accepted, according to Miyazawa, 
the government’s proposal to change the fundamental principle of sovereignty was legally 
permissible. Exactly speaking, it only confirmed the accomplished revolution. This was the 
August Revolution theory. 
 This theory was first asserted to advocate for the draft of the Constitution, not the 
new Constitution itself. Miyazawa explained that the government did not dare to bring 
about a revolutionary change, which was legally forbidden at the time, because it had 
already occurred in August 1945. 
 
 III  The Spread of the August Revolution Theory and its Weak Points 
The government proposed the new Constitution to the Diet, and after deliberations there, 
the Constitution of Japan was approved and promulgated. However, during the debates in 
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the Diet, the government did not accept the August Revolution theory. It claimed that there 
were no limits to amendments of the Constitution and that according to the amendment 
clause of the Meiji Constitution, it could be replaced completely.2 
 After the new Constitution took effect, the August Revolution theory nevertheless 
became the commonly-held opinion as to the legal explanation of its birth. The decisive 
merit of this theory is that it clearly expressed the severance between the two Constitutions. 
This theory spread especially because of the famous debate between Miyazawa and Tomoo 
Otaka, his colleague at the University of Tokyo, known as the controversy on the 
sovereignty of “nomos.” Otaka saw in the August Revolution theory Miyazawa’s will to 
make the change of the principle of sovereignty clear. Otaka wondered, however, if the 
new Constitution, which was based on such an unfamiliar idea for the Japanese, would be 
maintained. He tried to explain that popular sovereignty and the new position of the Tenno 
as the national symbol did not mean a fundamental severance of Japanese political 
traditions.3  
 Otaka said that politics should always be led by the idea of justice. He called this 
claim the sovereignty of nomos. Holders of sovereign power should not exercise it as they 
wish, but they are responsible for following this idea. Who has the sovereign power is then 
not the most important problem in politics. In Japanese history, the sovereignty of the 
Tenno had surely not meant that he had had absolute power, but that the idea of justice had 
been connected with him. The new Constitution demanded that the people themselves 
should have the responsibility for realizing the correct policies. Nevertheless, the 
sovereignty of nomos itself remained unchanged. Otaka suggested that the Tenno could 
play a meaningful role even under the new Constitution as a symbol of the “general will” 
of the people (not the will of the simple majority). 
 Miyazawa criticized Otaka in that his theory glossed over the severance of the 
principle of sovereignty.4 The sovereignty of nomos did not answer the problem of who 
had sovereign power. Although we can agree that politics should follow justice, the 
                                                     
2 See Nobuyoshi Ashibe, Kenpo-gaku I (Constitutional Theory I) 194f. (1992). 
3 Tomoo Otaka, Kokumin-shuken to Tenno-sei (Popular Sovereignty and the Institution of Tenno) 
(1947). 
4 Toshiyoshi Miyazawa, Kenpo no Genri (Principles of Constitutional Law) 281ff. (1967, first 
published in 1948). 
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problem of who definitively decides its content does not disappear. Here, the new principle 
of popular sovereignty was uncompromisingly opposed to the sovereignty of the Tenno. 
Miyazawa demanded that the Japanese should clearly recognize that the Japanese 
traditional principle of the sovereignty of the Tenno had already been denied. He also 
disagreed that the Tenno symbolized popular sovereignty. There was no reasonable basis to 
still see the Tenno as the necessary symbol for the correct policies. 
 Many constitutional scholars supported Miyazawa’s position which declared that 
the Constitution of Japan stood on the absolutely new principle of sovereignty. It was not 
just amendments of the old Constitution, but a totally new Constitution following the 
August Revolution. This theory seemed to be appropriate to establish democracy in 
postwar Japan. However, to select this theory to explain the legitimacy of the new 
Constitution meant at the same time that the constitutionalists dared to break the tradition 
of Japanese politics.   
 The August Revolution theory has some weak points. The fatal one is its 
interpretation that the Potsdam Declaration demanded Japan to adopt popular sovereignty. 
It certainly demanded a democratic government, but it was not at all clear whether this 
meant to change the fundamental principle of sovereignty. In August 1945, the Japanese 
government did not think so. It therefore just accepted this recommendation to surrender. 
Miyazawa himself also did not think so until he was faced with the draft of the government 
in March 1946. He published an article in October 1945 in which he said that the Meiji 
Constitution did not need to be amended to meet the demands of the Potsdam Declaration.5 
The August Revolution theory was based on a fragile interpretation of this declaration, 
which Miyazawa constructed in hindsight to legitimize the new principles included in the 
draft of the new Constitution.6 
 After the end of the occupation, the hidden facts about the draft making of the new 
Constitution were gradually revealed. Most parts of the government draft had been a 
translation from the English version made by the Allied Powers. The conservatives 
                                                     
5 Toshiyoshi Miyazawa, Kenpo-kaisei ni tsuite (On Amendments of the Constitution), Mainichi 
Shinbun, Oct.19, 1945, at 1. 
6 See Ryuichi Nagao, Nihon Kokka-shisoshi Kenkyu (Studies on the History of Theories on the 
State in Japan) 140ff. (1982).   
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publically declared their antagonism to the “enforced Constitution.” Moreover, the 
enforcement of the new Constitution on Japan itself was said to exceed the conditions of 
the Potsdam Declaration. According to the August Revolution theory, Japan needed to 
accept a new Constitution based on popular sovereignty. The conservatives were 
nevertheless not persuaded of this theory based on a rather unpersuasive interpretation of 
the Potsdam Declaration. Constitutional scholars were criticized as they still supported the 
August Revolution theory to defend the Constitution of Japan, which had truly not been 
born democratically at all. How to evaluate this theory has been an important dividing line 
in the continuing debates on the legitimacy of the Constitution of Japan. 
 
 IV  Evaluating the August Revolution theory  
The August Revolution theory has had both positive and negative effects on the disputes 
regarding the legitimacy of the Constitution of Japan. On the positive side, it has been 
agreed that the change of the Constitution after the Second World War meant a 
fundamental conversion of the principle of who has the ultimate sovereign power in Japan. 
It is now unanimous that Japan has had two Constitutions in its history, although the 
Constitution of Japan was officially enacted as amendments to the Meiji Constitution. 
Moreover, the August Revolution theory seems to have played an important role to rigidly 
restrict the competence of the Tenno by clearly showing the radical change of his position. 
It definitively drove the sovereignty of the Tenno into the past and emphasized that Japan 
should maintain a new democratic government. 
 Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the August Revolution theory at first 
aimed to declare that the government draft of the new Constitution in March 1946 was 
NOT revolutionary. It said that the plan of the government was legally not problematic 
because the revolution had already occurred in August 1945. The Japanese could only 
resign themselves. As mentioned above, however, this interpretation of the Potsdam 
Declaration is not entirely persuasive. Shortly after the defeat, the future structure of the 
Japanese government had not yet been determined, as Miyazawa himself had recognized. 
In fact, the government draft was itself revolutionary. The deliberation on the new 
Constitution was the process of revolutionary change, and the revolution was accomplished 
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with the enactment of the Constitution of Japan. The August Revolution theory ridded this 
process of its revolutionary character. 
 If such an important scholar as Miyazawa had insisted that the government 
proposal inherently meant a legally impossible change and asked the Japanese people if 
they were ready to support it, the legislative process for the new Constitution would have 
suffered from much more opposition. We might thank his help in concealing its 
revolutionary character. However, after the enactment of the Constitution, the August 
Revolution theory was put forth as a legal explanation for its birth. It can be argued that it 
has worked out to let the Japanese lose the consciousness that they were responsible for 
this fundamental conversion of the government structure.  
 It was comical that the conservative groups which had supported the new 
Constitution in 1946 began to attack it as an “enforced Constitution” after the end of the 
occupation. Under the occupation, the competency of Japanese government bodies was of 
course restricted, but that does not exempt them from the responsibility for their behavior 
at that time. In fact, they forgot their responsibility for producing the Constitution so 
quickly. It is possible that the August Revolution theory, according to which the basic 
principles of the coming Japanese government had been determined by the Allied Powers 
and that the Japanese had not contributed to the revolutionary change, helped this trend. 
 Therefore, this author agrees with the theory of Koji Sato, a former professor at 
Kyoto University, that the Meiji Constitution still remained valid after the defeat, but the 
will of the people to enact the Constitution of Japan based on the revolutionary new 
principle of popular sovereignty was clarified during the deliberations. The legitimacy of 
the Constitution of Japan should be sought in this sovereign will of the people.7  
 Finally, it is doubtful whether Miyazawa continued to assert that the August 
Revolution theory legitimized the Constitution of Japan. In 1957, he wrote an article about 
the legitimacy of constitutions to refute the conservative insistence that the Constitution of 
Japan should be seen as invalid because it revolutionarily denied the sovereignty of the 
Tenno. Miyazawa did not resort to the August Revolution theory there, however. He denied 
the idea that the legitimacy of constitutions could be sought in how they are born. He said 
                                                     
7 Koji Sato, Nihonkoku-kenpo-ron (On the Constitution of Japan) 68 (2011). 
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that constitutions are legitimate if they guarantee freedom and minimum standards of 
existence for everyone. He recognized that his assertion was the same as Gustav 
Radbruch’s natural law theory after the Second World War.8  
 It is not clear if and how this assertion is compatible with the August Revolution 
theory. One can imagine that Miyazawa saw that the latter thesis, which was originally 
insisted upon to legitimize the draft of the new Constitution, had already lost its 
significance. To defend the Constitution, which began to be established in Japanese society, 
it might be better to directly evaluate its contents.  
 However, the conservatives are discontent anyway with the very contents of the 
Constitution of Japan, especially the broad guarantees of human rights and pacifism, and 
believe that they are included in the Japanese Constitution just because it was enforced by 
the Allied Powers. In the discussions in Japan, the birth and the contents of the 
Constitution of Japan are problems that are tied together inseparably. The conservatives 
have never averted their eyes from the defect today’s Constitution had at its birth. The 
legitimacy of the Constitution of Japan is still disputed today. Because the August 
Revolution theory has been the most famous and popular explanation to defend it, we 
cannot escape from 1946, when the “new” Constitution was enacted.                                                                  
                                                     
8 Toshiyoshi Miyazawa, Kenpo no Genri (Principles of Constitutional Law) 401ff. (1967, first 
published in 1957). 
